



A.I.P.P.M.

Distr.: General

Date of Submission: 02.08.2017

Original: English

All India Political Parties Meet

KiiT International School Model United Nations 2017, Bhubaneswar, 11th-13th August, 2017.

Background Guide

Agenda 1: Foreign Policy Roadmap
Agenda 2: Electoral Reforms in India

| The present document intends to make you aware of the background of the problem. Its content does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of KiiT-IS MUN 2017. |



All Copyrights Reserved by

| KiiT International School Model United Nations 2017 |

Report Prepared by:

The Executive Board

All India Political Parties Meet

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Members and Prospective Members,

Greetings! On behalf of the entire team here at the KIITIS MUN 2017 and the moderation panel of the All India Political Parties Meet being simulated at the conference, I extend a very warm welcome to all of you.

Let me first start off by commending you on your choice of council- a very often and sometimes fair criticism of MUN conferences is that they fail to bring about any tangible change; an AIPPM directly challenges that notion, and in two ways:

- 1) Constructive solutions that come out of these meetings can actually be thrashed out, suggested to higher levels and implemented. With the agenda of Indian committees being easier to relate to and understand in terms of stakeholders, ground realities and all other aspects, we are more likely to make informed, mature and sensible decisions.
- 2) By participating in simulations like these, you will all get to understand the real issues and the stance of major political parties on these issues, beyond the rhetoric and all the noise. This makes you a more informed and aware citizen, which is an asset for any democracy and a tool of change for one like India.

Coming to this meeting of the AIPPM, the session will have 3 agenda items, which are contentious in principle to the two major national parties and also to smaller regional parties. A well-balanced representation of all will make for healthy discussion. These items are:

- Foreign Policy Roadmap
- Electoral Reforms

Coming to the background guide, over time, as a delegate and as an Executive Board member, I've tried to understand what kind of a study document is going to be most beneficial for participants. Some moderators prefer comprehensive guides, while some leave it at only listing our pertinent issues. What we've done here is followed a mixture of both systems, where we've shared basic insight on all the agenda items. Why this has been done is because you will, on a first reading be able to understand the issue and basic arguments, and on a closer analysis, the counter arguments and pro-cons of both.

On topics such as foreign policy or timelines of events, it is virtually and logically impossible to 'write' a Background guide, since the events need to be reported as they were, and not as a representation, to ensure that delegates' interpretation is without any bias. In such a case, most EBs plainly copy-paste stuff off the internet, and reword, which although is a better approach, is useless. What we've done here is, linked relevant articles and op-eds which will help you read and understand the situation. These websites have also been chosen for the accuracy of the content on their redirect links. In our opinion, this should be a sufficient starting point for all.

About flow of committee, the order of agenda items will be decided by simple majority. There shall be no rules of procedure, for the purpose of rules is to facilitate debate and not restrict them, and they end up doing the latter. The committee will debate in three different rounds- Opening Statements, Moderated Short Period Discussion, Un-moderated Short Period Discussion/Private Session. What these rounds are and what is done is something that will be explained in council itself.

For documentation, the committee will have chits, memorandums and suggestive(s), which will all be explained in council.

Please note that the use of laptops and internet/any gadget is not allowed. Kindly get your research in hard copy. The idea is that all members know and understand issues, instead of having 100 page documents in their laptops that they never read.

This will be it from my side for now. If you have any queries, please feel free to write to me at siddharthgoyal09@yahoo.com. I can't wait to meet and interact with you all!

Warmest Regards,
Siddharth Goyal
Moderator, AIPPM.

AGENDA ITEM- FOREIGN POLICY ROADMAP

The discussion on this agenda should cover two major policy issues, which are:

1. Setting India's Agenda for 2017-18 at Asian Multilateral Forums:

An in depth analysis of the government policy at

- Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
- Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
- Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)

and, in the course of its discussion, focus on the following:

- Analyzing India's contributions to these forums,
- Devising a roadmap to establish influence in the Asia region,
- Tactical importance of strategically using these forums to counter growing Chinese influence,
- Any other matter of relevance.

Further Readings:

1. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/ranisingh/2016/03/17/whats-stopping-india-joining-the-asia-pacific-economic-forum/>
2. <https://www.idsa-india.org/an-mar-2.html>
3. <http://www.mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm>
4. <http://asean.org/asean/external-relations/india/>
5. <http://thediplomat.com/tag/india-asean-relations/>
6. http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-seeks-to-extend-udan-scheme-to-bimstec-countries-117060601566_1.html
7. <http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/bimstec-at-20-hopes-and-apprehensions skundu 200617>
8. <http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?24315/India+and+SAARC+Interlinked+Dreams>
9. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/097492840105700207?journalCode=iqqa>
10. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/is-saarc-doomed/>

11. <http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/redefining-sagar-in-indian-ocean/article7248385.ece>
12. <http://www.idsa.in/idsanews/india-and-the-indian-ocean-skundu>
13. <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20707/Indian+Ocean+Rim+Association+for+Regional+Cooperation+IORARC>
14. <https://www.thedollarbusiness.com/magazine/saarc-and-india-why-india-needs-a-strong-saarc/7278>

2. Examining India's relations with P5 nations, with focus on a road map for a permanent SC seat:

1. <http://www.huffingtonpost.in/martand-jha/5-foreign-policy-trends-in-three-years-of-the-modi-government-a-22121586/>
2. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/where-india-headed-possible-future-directions-indian-foreign-policy>

China:

1. <https://thewire.in/115558/modis-approach-foreign-policy-disrupted-indias-ties-china/>
2. <http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/modis-china-policy-changes-quickly-between-2-major-summits-1711464>
3. <http://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/is-china-punishing-india-for-its-belt-and-road-stance-while-testing-modi-and-trump/story-1NIB0lcGtgMy4UV05pD01M.html>
4. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0009445517696630?journalCode=c hra>
5. <https://qz.com/404869/a-complete-timeline-of-india-china-relations-since-modi-took-charge/>
6. <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/obor-india-foreign-policy-china-south-asia/story/1/17201.html>

Russia:

1. <http://www.firstpost.com/india/narendra-modi-meets-vladimir-putin-full-text-of-the-india-russia-joint-statement-3507551.html>
2. <http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/revitalising-india-russia-ties-a-challenge-for-modi/story-N7MoezZklTwF9u4thlrxgL.html>
3. <http://www.firstpost.com/world/narendra-modi-meets-vladimir-putin-retracing-70-years-of-india-russia-diplomatic-relations-3519793.html>
4. <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/sengcF8LFc2QxVWk75r4wK/Modi-visit-India-Russia-ink-pact-to-expand-Kudankulam-nucl.html>

5. <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/narendra-modi-vladimir-putin-india-russia-ties/story/1/16399.html>

USA:

1. <http://www.civildaily.com/story/foreign-policy-watch-india-us/>
2. <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-us-agree-to-strengthen-ties-to-ensure-peace-in-afghan/articleshow/59329530.cms>
3. <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/modi-trump-meeting-multiple-embraces-signals-india-us-ties-on-strong-footing-4725197/>
4. <https://thewire.in/115558/modis-approach-foreign-policy-disrupted-indias-ties-china/>
5. <http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/on-china-modi-won-unexpected-support-from-trump-1717914>
6. <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/modi-trump-diplomacy-pakistan-body-language-jobs/story/1/18044.html>

UK:

1. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/06/india-warns-uk-immigration-policy-wreck-post-brexit-trade-deal>
2. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/UK-Jan_2016_en.pdf
3. <http://fpc.org.uk/articles/316>
4. <https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/brexit-india-and-the-future-for-uk-diplomacy-a-road-to-somewhere-98e04d4bbb6e>

France:

1. <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-modi-in-france-live-updates-french-president-emmanuel-macron-4687251/>
2. <http://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-with-president-emmanuel-macron-of-france-at-joint-press-statements-in-paris-france-535730>
3. <http://www.firstpost.com/india/narendra-modi-in-france-for-true-meaning-of-pms-visit-look-beyond-headlines-on-climate-and-terror-3515965.html>

3. India's Pakistan Policy

The major argument by commentators opposed to Prime Minister Modi's foreign policy relative to Pakistan is that he is opening talks at a time when the Sharif government is weak and the balance of power has decisively tilted in favor of the Pakistani military establishment.

Nawaz Sharif went to Modi's inauguration ceremony despite resistance from Pakistan's powerful army and refused to meet Hurriyat leaders. Instead of capitalizing on this gesture, Modi cancelled secretary-level talks with Islamabad on the grounds that the Pakistani ambassador to India had continued with the longstanding practice of meeting with Kashmiri separatists. This weakened Nawaz's ability to improve relations with India. Increased tensions at the Line of Control and Kashmir, in which Modi responded to cease-fire violations in a way that went beyond tit-for-tat worsened the situation.

Islamabad, however, was confident that apart from these ceasefire violations, New Delhi will not risk actual conflict, because of the risk it will turn nuclear. But the Indian army's raid in Myanmar against militants has Islamabad worried that India might pursue the same option against Pakistan. The latter's tactical nuclear weapons are meant to counter India's "Cold Start" strategy of an offensive strike within Pakistan in order to punish terrorist elements. India, for its part, has made clear that it would deploy strategic nuclear weapons in response to Pakistan's use of short-range nukes. There is no clarity on how to prevent an escalation in the event of conflict and Modi is taking a risk in raising public expectations of an aggressive response to Pakistan.

Some argue that Modi should rely on robust anti-Pakistan rhetoric to retain his domestic support in case he fails to fulfill his election promises of economic growth and good governance. For its part, Islamabad is highly aware of the Modi's administration's penchant for provocative statements. Statements by senior Indian officials on sub-conventional warfare strengthen Islamabad's long-held view that India has not accepted Pakistan's independence and is working hard to destabilize it by supporting belligerent groups. Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval warned in February 2014 that, "you can do one Mumbai and you may lose Baluchistan." Similarly, Indian defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, stated that, "we should neutralize terrorists through terrorists only." Modi's remarks in Dhaka that Pakistan "promotes terrorism" were seen as further confirmation of his hawkish policy.

In addition, a BBC report on links between India's Research and Analysis Wing and the Karachi-based political party MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement) provided Islamabad with evidence that India is encouraging subversion itself, to balance Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir. This reopens old wounds from India's role in the creation of Bangladesh, and confirms Islamabad's fear that New Delhi is willing to do anything to break up Pakistan. Pakistan accuses India of supporting anti-Pakistan terrorist groups, including the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch separatists. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, warned that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if its survival were at stake. Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, still an advisor to Pakistan's National Command Authority and former Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, has described four conditions for nuclear use: a) space threshold (India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory); b) military threshold (India deploys a large part of its land or air forces); c) economic strangling; and d) domestic destabilization. India's support of anti-Pakistan elements would seem to meet that last condition.

India, on the other hand, blames Pakistan for terrorist activities in Kashmir and within India, ranging from the Twin Peak Crisis (2001-2002) to the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and the attack on the Indian embassy and consulate in Afghanistan. New Delhi protested the release of Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the mastermind behind the Mumbai attack, from prison, with Pakistani authorities claiming India had provided insufficient evidence to prosecute him in Pakistani courts. India tried to raise the matter of Lakhvi's release at the United Nations Sanctions Committee, under resolution 1267, but China used its veto to block. China's veto shows that Beijing is willing to shield Islamabad from international scrutiny despite New Delhi's sensitivities.

China and Pakistan are also expanding their influence in Afghanistan. After taking office, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani chose Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan for his first overseas visits. Ghani cancelled an arms deal with New Delhi before visiting India in April 2015. The Afghan president is also reaching out to Afghan Taliban for talks facilitated by Islamabad and Beijing. After U.S. forces withdraw, New Delhi's influence in Afghanistan is likely to weaken.

Beijing is meanwhile investing \$46 billion in Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (CPEC) to link its underdeveloped western frontier with the Persian Gulf and Middle East through Pakistan. The CPEC would provide infrastructure within Pakistan in support of Beijing's plan of storing Middle Eastern oil in refineries at Gwadar and sending it to China via road or pipeline. Gwadar port is

already operational, and has strategic significance for both Beijing and Islamabad. In September 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping invited India to join the economic corridor, but Modi baulked because of fears of a growing Chinese foothold in the Indian Ocean. India is developing the Iranian port of Chabahar as a competitor to Gwadar, but construction will take some time.

Indian attempts to isolate or ignore Pakistan will not yield the desired results and are counter-productive given Islamabad's position as the second largest country in South Asia and its strong links with China. Militarily India cannot afford to be confrontational with Pakistan, because of the latter's nuclear weapons. Politically and economically New Delhi cannot isolate Pakistan, which enjoys strong ties with China. New Delhi has no option but to engage Islamabad constructively by opening dialogue. It is in India's interest to reduce Pakistan's sense of insecurity by initiating negotiations and using confidence building measures to reduce Islamabad's reliance on nuclear weapons. India's dream of great power status will be hard to achieve without a solution to the "Pakistan problem."

Modi may want to talk tough for domestic political reasons, but it is self-defeating in a number of ways. First, it constrains India's options in a future conflict, as he would be under tremendous option to respond aggressively, a highly dangerous move given the presence of nuclear weapons. Second, it is unnecessarily provocative and gives strength to anti-India elements in Pakistan. Third, it raises international concerns that are not only damaging to the Indian economy but also pairs India with Pakistan, something that New Delhi has long abhorred.

For India, the only way to de-hyphenate itself from Pakistan is to improve relations with Islamabad through bold initiatives. Modi, who has always advocated a more muscular approach to national security, cannot ignore Pakistan, but must also recognize that a hardline approach will create problems for New Delhi. His huge victory gave Modi the political space to reach out to Pakistan in ways his predecessor could not. South Asia expert Stephen P. Cohen, once said, "India cannot make peace. Pakistan cannot make war."

To expect any Pakistani government, much less this Nawaz Sharif one, would completely rewrite their relationship with the Hurriyat is asking for too much. Today, the Hurriyat must be a very satisfied bunch. They have struggled to find issues to keep themselves in the news. Other than capitalizing on the deaths of civilians during law and order disturbances, or to cross fire during an

operation, there hasn't been much for the Hurriyat to peddle to the people of Kashmir. The high turnout in the Panchayat elections and respectable turnouts in the two elections of 2014 did the Hurriyat no favours.

A possible meeting between Pakistani NSA Sartaj Aziz and the Hurriyat leaders would, at best, have been a side show generating little or no interest. It is possible that because of the cancellation of the previously scheduled Foreign Secretary-level talks, there may have been a bit more interest than usual, but it would have been nothing like the amount of attention that was finally heaped on them when they became the reason for a nasty war of words between India and Pakistan. Previous central governments have always turned a blind-eye to meetings between visiting Pakistani officials and Hurriyat leaders. They haven't liked the fact that these meetings happen, but wisely concluded that allowing them was the lesser of two evils. This time was dramatically different. The Modi Government in the centre, and the Mufti Government in the state, joined hands to detain the Hurriyat leaders before they could leave for Delhi. In the game of one-upmanship, someone sitting in Delhi probably felt this would be the game-changer that would force Pakistan to pull out of the talks.

The Hurriyat leaders have been invited to a reception along with hundreds of others but their meeting with Aziz is a photo op. Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistani establishment need to convince their detractors that what they agreed to at Ufa was not a betrayal. While the same photo will be flashed by Modi's detractors as proof of his failure to stand firm on his threats, it is important that the Prime Minister stands firm on the course he has chosen. As he said in his speech to the Indian community in the UAE earlier, "however complicated a problem might be, it can be solved through dialogue."

In essence, this All India Parties Meet has to find a way around the following blockades:

- Pak army will never accept ring-fencing, which is why cross-border firing has intensified
- Pak has powerful international backers like China, Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries
- India has no fidayeen or non-state actors to use as foreign policy instruments
- Democratic India's compulsions drive it to seek peace with Pakistan

AGENDA ITEM: ELECTORAL REFORMS

of the most important things that make a democracy function is a comprehensive electoral process. The Election Commission of India (EC) for the last six-decades has managed to carry out elections in the country in free and unbiased manner, however, with the passage of time every process need certain amendments to keep up with the contemporary practices, and so does the electoral process of India.

Consequently, over the number of years many reports and recommendations by various statutory and independent organizations have been proposed.

Both the Law Commission of India in its 170th report on “Reforms on Electoral Laws” in 1999 and the Election Commission of India in its report on “Proposed Electoral Reforms” in 2004, respectively, have proposed their suggestions on the said issue, however, same are yet to be considered. There are other committees and commissions as well which have examined the prevalent challenges to the present electoral system:

- The Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990)
- The Vohra Committee Report (1993)
- The Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998)
- The Law Commission Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999)
- The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2001)
- The ECI – Proposed Electoral Reforms (2004)
- The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2008)

In 2013, The Ministry of Law and Justice requested the 20th Law Commission to consider this issue in entirety and suggest certain recommendations in this regard. Consequently, the Law Commission under the chairmanship of Justice (Retired) D.K. Jain, Prepared and circulated the Consultation Paper in this regard. The said Consultation Paper listed certain issues for consideration including decriminalisation of politics and consequent disqualification of candidates; false affidavits; need to strengthen law relating to the period of disqualification; State funding of elections - expenses and donations to political parties; conduct of political parties; law relating to disqualification of

candidates and enhancement of punishment, etc. the said paper was widely circulated amongst political parties and elected representatives of both the houses of the Parliament and State Legislatures. However, only eight members of the Parliament, four each from the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha, responded.

It is more often the case in India that the executive had not shown much interest on this very subject, which created space for judiciary to intervene. Experts argue that electoral reforms in India are driven more by judicial pronouncements. Major changes brought in by the judicial pronouncement are as follow:

- In 2002, the Hon'ble Supreme Court (SC) of India directed that all the contesting candidates will have to furnish all personal information, including the criminal record at the time of filing nomination papers.
- In 2013, Hon'ble SC held that under Sec 8(4) of RPA, 1951 – A legislator shall be disqualified automatically from being a member of the house, if he is convicted and sentenced for 2 or more years of imprisonment in a court of law (Appeal to higher court will not provide relief to legislator, which was the case earlier).
- In another judgment in 2013, the Hon'ble Apex Court gave the citizens – 'Right to negative vote during elections, which came to be known as NOTA (None of the above).
- In 2014, the Hon'ble SC directed the trial court to dispose-off the criminal cases involving MPs and MLAs/MLCs within 1 year, after the charges are framed by court of law.

I - State Funding of Elections – It basically means that government extending financial assistance (cash/kind) to political parties (partly/fully) for contesting elections. The objective is to control and eliminate outside pressure over govt. policies and functioning by vested interests. It will also help in controlling the flow of unaccounted money and muscle power during elections and control the levels of corruption in public life.

II - Compulsory Voting – The voting in elections to Lok Sabha and Assembly are optional in India, but it is compulsory in 33 countries of the world including Brazil, Australia, Egypt, etc. The Gujarat Local Authorities Law (Amendment) Act 2009, has made voting compulsory in local bodies election.

III - Bringing Political Party under RTI Act – In 2013, Central Information Commission (CIC) held that National Political Parties (NPP) are public authorities within the meaning of Sec 2(h) of RTI Act and directed them to appoint public information officer to provide necessary information as required by the citizens. However, all the 6 NPP had defied the direction of CIC on the ground that they are not public authorities within the meaning of RTI Act.

IV - Financial Restriction on Spending – The basic rationale behind imposing the official limits on expenditure is to provide a level playing field. This is criticized as the resources are limited, candidates are not able to convey their message and thus voters are not able to make informed choice. The bigger problem is that candidates rely almost completely on unaccounted cash from undisclosed donors. This also negates the transparency initiatives of the EC.

V - Voting Rights for Prisoner's – Per an SC judgment, prisoners are second-class citizens and therefore it is necessary to exclude their polluting influence from the sanctity of democratic process. It is criticized on the account that there is no-offence/ sentence based classification. It does not distinguish between prisoners, under-trials and those in lawful custody.

VI - Use of Aadhar – The Aadhar no. has the potential to resolve the issue of migration and thus avoiding duplication. It makes possible to enroll a person in one polling station and simultaneously remove his name from a different polling station. Currently, this process is very cumbersome, giving rise to multiple voter cards for a single person. It will also facilitate easy incorporation of minors in the electoral rolls, once they turn 18.

VII - Paid News – It is basically the commercialization of news content for revenue generation by print/electronic media. It is essentially an advertisement which is disguised as professional news and published in media with the purpose of misleading the general public. EC wants the paid news to be made electoral offence with not less than 2 years of imprisonment so that such individuals are disqualified from contesting elections.

VIII – Simultaneous Elections – This means conducting elections for Union and State Legislatures at the same time. Currently in India approximately 2 to 3 states go for elections every year which has following consequences:

(a) It undermines the working of the union government in power which may not take tough decisions due to the fear of a backlash in the next round of assembly election.

(b) It will also curtail election expenditure which are un-necessary. The arrangement of simultaneous elections can be extended to the elections for the municipal corporations and other Panchayati Raj institutions.

BEST OF LUCK WITH YOUR PREPARATIONS!